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Abstract
Motivated by posted price auctions where buyers are grouped in an unknown number of
latent types characterized by their private values for the good on sale, we investigate revenue
maximization in stochastic dynamic pricing when the distribution of buyers’ private values is
supported on an unknown set of points in [0, 1] of unknown cardinality K. This setting can be
viewed as an instance of a stochastic K-armed bandit problem where the location of the arms
(i.e., the K unknown valuations) must be learned as well.
1. In the distribution-free case, we show that our setting is just as hard asK-armed stochastic
bandits: we prove that no algorithm can achieve a regret significantly better than
√
KT ,
(where T is the time horizon) and present an efficient algorithm matching this lower bound
up to logarithmic factors.
2. In the distribution-dependent case, we show that for allK > 2 our setting is strictly harder
than K-armed stochastic bandits by proving that it is impossible to obtain regret bounds
that grow logarithmically in time or slower. On the other hand, when a lower bound γ > 0
on the smallest drop in the demand curve is known, we prove an upper bound on the regret
of order
(
1/∆+ (log logT )/γ2
)(
K logT
)
, where ∆ is the gap between the revenue of the
optimal valuation and that of the second-best valuation. This is a significant improvement
on previously known regret bounds for discontinuous demand curves, that are at best of
order
(
K12/γ8
)√
T .
3. When K = 2 in the distribution-dependent case, the hardness of our setting reduces to
that of a stochastic 2-armed bandit: we prove that an upper bound of order (logT )/∆ (up
to log log factors) on the regret can be achieved with no information on the demand curve.
4. Finally, we show a O(√T ) upper bound on the regret for the setting in which the buyers’
decisions are nonstochastic, and the regret is measured with respect to the best between
two fixed valuations one of which is known to the seller.
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1 Introduction
In the online posted price auction problem, also known as dynamic pricing, an unlimited supply
of identical goods is sold to a sequence of buyers. To each buyer in the sequence, the seller makes
a take-it-or-leave-it offer for the good at a certain price (which we assume to belong to the unit
interval [0, 1]). The good is purchased if and only if the offered price is lower or equal to the buyer’s
private valuation (also assumed to be in [0, 1]). At the end of the transaction, the seller’s revenue
is either zero (if the good is not sold) or equal to the offered price. The buyer’s valuation is never
observed. Indeed, the seller only learns a single bit for each auction, i.e., whether the good was sold
or not at the chosen price. Similarly to previous works [20, 9, 8], we assume that the price offered
to the t-th buyer in the sequence only depends on the past history of observed sales. In particular,
we assume that buyers are indistinguishable, and provide no information to the seller other than
their willingness to buy at the specified price. For this reason, the seller can post the price for the
next buyer publicly, before the buyer shows up.
We evaluate the seller’s performance in terms of regret, measuring the difference between the
seller’s revenue and the revenue achievable by consistently posting the optimal price. The regret in
dynamic pricing was initially investigated by Kleinberg and Leighton [20] under various assumptions
on the generation of the buyers’ valuations. In the stochastic setting, in which valuations are drawn
i.i.d. from a fixed and unknown distribution on [0, 1], they show that no algorithm can achieve a
o(
√
T ) regret and provide an algorithm achieving regret of order C
√
T log T , where T is the number
of buyers in the sequence and C only depends on the distribution of buyers’ valuations. Their upper-
bound holds under some assumptions on the demand curve, which is the function D mapping each
price x to the probability D(x) = P(V ≥ x) that the good is sold. Specifically, the revenue function
x 7→ xD(x) is required to have a unique global maximum x⋆ ∈ (0, 1) and be twice differentiable with
a negative second derivative at x⋆. Without these assumptions, the authors prove a much higher
lower bound of order T 2/3 on the regret. The algorithm achieving the C
√
T log T regret under
the above assumptions on the demand curve is simple: it runs the UCB1 policy for stochastic
bandits [3] on a discretized set of K = (T/ log T )1/4 prices.
In this paper, we study the stochastic setting of dynamic pricing under completely different
assumptions on the demand curve. Namely, that the distribution of buyers’ valuations is supported
on an unknown set of unknown finite cardinality K. This models any setting in which buyers
are grouped in an unknown number of latent types, characterized by their private values for the
good on sale. In particular, this applies to regret minimization in sellers’ repeated second-price
auctions with a single relevant buyer. This scenario emerges naturally when a seller and a buyer
interact repeatedly, and the valuation of the good depends on contextual information known only
to the buyer. For instance, in online advertising each time a user lands on a publisher’s website, an
impression is put on sale to a set of relevant advertisers through an auction (note that whenever
there is a single relevant advertiser for the impression, second-price auctions with reserve price are
equivalent to posted price auctions). Now, typically, the advertiser’s valuation for the impression
depends on which segment the user belongs to, where the finite segmentation is based on private
information not accessible to the publisher.
Note that our model is very different from assuming that the seller is restricted to offer prices
from a known finite set of size K [23], which makes dynamic pricing a special case of K-armed
stochastic bandits. In our model, the seller does not know the K buyers’ valuations, not even their
number! So, besides learning which valuation has the highest revenue, the seller must also learn
the location of these values. This interplay between noisy search and bandit allocation is one of
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the main themes of our work.
In contrast with previous approaches, which typically assume parametric [10] or locally smooth
[20] demand curves, our model with finitely many valuations is equivalent to assuming that the
demand curve is piecewise constant with a finite number of discontinuities. Recently, den Boer
and Keskin [16] designed an algorithm for piecewise continuous demand curves achieving an upper
bound of order C
√
T log T in the piecewise constant case. However, up to constant factors, their
hefty leading constant C is at least as big as the maximum between K22γ−16c−2 and K12γ−8c−18,
where c is the minimum distance between valuations and both K and the smallest drop γ in the
demand curve must be known in advance. Although their setting extends ours to certain piecewise
parametric demand curves, we believe that discontinuities are the real source of additional hardness
of this dynamic pricing model with respect to previously studied settings.
Our first result is a lower bound of order
√
KT on the regret in the distribution-free case (where
the regret is maximized over all possible demand curves), which holds even when the seller knows
the number and position of buyers’ private values in advance. This essentially establishes that our
setting is at least as hard as a K-armed bandit problem. Although we build on the stochastic lower
bound of Kleinberg and Leighton [20], our proof is not a simple adaptation of theirs. Indeed, we
show that their proof breaks down when K is constant and T grows, which is exactly the regime
we are interested in. Then, we present an efficient algorithm achieving a distribution-free upper
bound on the regret of order
√
KT log T without any additional knowledge of the parameters of the
problem.1 The detailed version of our bound has a significantly better dependence than den Boer
and Keskin [16] on the smallest difference c between two adjacent valuations, and matches—up to
logarithmic factors—the lower bound stated above.
In the distribution-dependent case, when the gap ∆ between the revenue of the optimal valuation
and that of the second-best valuation is constant, we prove the impossibility of obtaining regret
bounds of order significantly better than
√
T even when K = 3, thus showing that this setting
is strictly harder than K-armed stochastic bandits. Motivated by this impossibility result, we
investigate distribution-dependent bounds that rely on additional information about the demand
curve. By combining suitable generalizations of UCB1 [3] and the “cautious search” strategy of
Kleinberg and Leighton [20], we obtain an efficient algorithm achieving a regret of order at most(
1/∆+(log log T )/γ2
)(
K log T
)
, where, as before, γ is the smallest drop in the demand curve. Since
(K/∆) log T is the regret ofK-armed stochastic bandits, this shows that the price of identifying each
one of the K valuations is at most (log T )(log log T )/γ2, which corresponds (up to log log factors)
to the known upper bounds for noisy binary search [19]. We conclude the study of the distribution-
dependent case by presenting an efficient algorithm with regret of order (1/∆ + log log T ) log T
when the number of valuations is known to be at most two. Surprisingly, this bound is the same
(up to log log terms) as the best possible bound for two-armed stochastic bandits, achievable when
not only the number, but also the locations of the valuations are known in advance. In order to
prove this result we introduce a novel technique for estimating (up to a multiplicative constant)
the expectation µ of any [0, 1]-valued random variable with probability at least 1− δ, using at most
O( 1µ ln 1δ ) samples, even if the expectation µ is not known in advance. We believe this technique
may be valuable in its own right.
1Throughout this paper we assume that the time horizon T is known by the seller in advance. This assumption
can be easily removed with a “doubling trick” (see, e.g., [14]), a standard technique for extending regret bounds to
time sequences of unknown length.
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2 Further related works
The literature on dynamic pricing and online posted price auctions is vast. We address the reader
to the excellent survey published by den Boer [17], providing a comprehensive picture of the state
of the art until the end of 2014 —see also the tutorial slides by Slivkins and Zeevi [24] for a
perspective more focused on computer science approaches. An important line of work in dynamic
pricing considers a nonstochastic setting in which the sequence of the buyers’ private values is
deterministic and unknown, and the seller competes against the best fixed price. This model was
pioneered by Kleinberg and Leighton [20], who proved a O(T 2/3) upper bound (ignoring logarithmic
factors) on the aforementioned notion of regret. Later works [9, 8] show simultaneous multiplicative
and additive bounds on the regret when prices have range [1, h]. These bounds have the form
εG⋆T +O
(
(h ln h)/ε2
)
ignoring ln lnh factors, where G⋆T is the total revenue of the optimal price p
⋆.
Recent improvements on these results are due to Bubeck et al. [13], who prove that the additive
term can be made O(p⋆(ln h)/ε2), where the linear scaling is now with respect to the optimal price
rather than the maximum price h. Other variants consider settings in which the number of copies
of the item to sell is limited [1, 5, 6] or settings in which a returning buyer acts strategically in
order to maximize his utility in future rounds [2, 18]
Finally, although in this work we focus on the seller’s side, regret minimization approaches have
been recently applied also on the buyer’s side, for example in [22, 26].
3 Preliminaries and definitions
We assume all valuations Vt belong to a fixed and unknown finite set V = {v1, . . . , vK} ⊂ [0, 1], with
0 = v0 ≤ v1 < · · · < vK ≤ vK+1 = 1. Unless otherwise specified, the sequence V1, V2, . . . is assumed
to be sampled i.i.d. from a fixed and unknown distribution on {v1, . . . , vK}. Let pi = P(V1 = vi)
and assume (without loss of generality) that pi > 0 for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,K}. An instance of the
posted price problem is then fully specified by the pairs (v1, p1), . . . , (vK , pK). We assume auctions
are implemented according to the following online protocol: for each round t ∈ {1, 2, . . . }
1. the seller posts a price Xt ∈ [0, 1]
2. buyer’s valuation Vt, hidden from the seller, is drawn from V according to {p1, . . . , pK}
3. the seller observes I {Vt ≥ Xt} ∈ {0, 1} and computes the revenue rt(Xt) = Xt I {Vt ≥ Xt}
Note that the expected revenue E[rt(x)] = E
[
x I {Vt ≥ x}
]
is equal to xD(x), where
D(x) = P(V1 ≥ x) =
∑
k : vk≥x
pk (1)
is the demand curve. Hence the price maximizing the expected revenue E[rt(x)] belongs to the set
of valuations {v1, . . . , vK} and we denote one of the possible optimal valuations by v⋆ = vi⋆ . We
define the suboptimality gap of vj with respect to v
⋆ by ∆j = E
[
r1(v
⋆)− r1(vj)
]
. The goal of the
seller is to minimize the regret
RT = max
x∈[0,1]
E
[
T∑
t=1
rt(x)−
T∑
t=1
rt(Xt)
]
= E
[
T∑
t=1
rt(v
⋆)− rt(Xt)
]
where the expectation is understood with respect to any randomness in the generation of V1, . . . , VT
and X1, . . . ,XT . Formally, a deterministic seller is a sequence of functions X1,X2, . . . where
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Xt = ft(X1, Z1, . . . ,Xt−1, Zt−1) is the price posted at time t, the random variable Zs is the binary
feedback I {Vs ≥ Xs} received by the seller in at time s, and ft :
(
[0, 1] × {0, 1})t−1 → [0, 1] is an
arbitrary function. A randomized seller is a probability distribution over deterministic sellers.
4 Lower bounds
In this section we show some important similarities and differences between dynamic pricing with
K valuations and the K-armed bandit problem. First, we state that in the distribution-free case
the former is at least as difficult as the latter. More precisely, if T ≥ K3, no algorithm can have
regret better than
√
KT on dynamic pricing with K valuations. The proof of the following theorem
is deferred to Appendix A.
Theorem 1. For any number of valuations K ≥ 3 and all time horizons T ≥ K3 there exist K pairs
(v1, p1), . . . , (vK , pK) such that the expected regret of any pricing strategy satisfies RT = Ω
(√
KT
)
.
Next, we show that in the distribution-dependent case, dynamic pricing is strictly harder than
multiarmed bandits. More precisely, even if the suboptimality gap ∆ is constant and K is small,
no dynamic pricing algorithm can have regret better than
√
T , whereas the distribution-dependent
regret of multiarmed bandits is O(log T ).
Theorem 2. If for some constant c⋆ > 0 a seller algorithm has regret smaller than c⋆
√
T on any
instance of the stochastic dynamic pricing problem with at most three valuations, then there exists
an instance with ∆ = Θ(1) on which the algorithm suffers regret Ω(
√
T ).
Proof. We consider two instances. The first has ∆ = 14 and the second has ∆ = O(1/
√
T ). We
prove that if the algorithm has regret O(√T ) on both instances, then it must have regret Ω(√T )
on the first instance. The two instances are defined as follows.
Instance 1
v
(1)
1 = 0 D
(1)(0) = 1 r(1)(0) = 0
v
(1)
2 =
1
2 D
(1)
(
1
2
)
= 12 r
(1)
(
1
2
)
= 14
Instance 2
v
(2)
1 = 0 D
(2)(0) = 1 r(2)(0) = 0
v
(2)
2 =
1−η
2 D
(2)
(1−η
2
)
= 12 + η r
(2)
(1−η
2
)
= 1+η−2η
2
4
v
(2)
3 =
1
2 D
(2)
(
1
2
)
= 12 r
(2)
(
1
2
)
= 14
In Instance 1 the optimal price is v
(1)
2 =
1
2 with revenue
1
4 . In Instance 2 the optimal price is
v
(2)
2 =
1−η
2 with revenue
1+η−2η2
4 ≥ 14 + η8 for η ≤ 14 . Without loss of generality, we can assume that
the seller algorithm only posts prices in the set
{
0, 1−η2 ,
1
2
}
. Let Nη(t) be the number of times that
the price 1−η2 is posted and let ν
(i)
t be the law of observed rewards up to time t in Instance i ∈ {1, 2}.
Since prices 0 and 12 are uninformative (because demand and revenue do no change across the two
instances), it follows from standard calculations that the KL divergence between ν
(1)
t and ν
(2)
t is
upper bounded by the KL between two Bernoulli of parameter 12 and
1
2 + η times the expected
number of times v2 is chosen under Instance 1,
KL
(
ν
(1)
t ‖ ν(2)t
) ≤ KL(1
2
∥∥∥ 1
2
+ η
)
E1
[
Nη(t)
] ≤ 4η2 E1[Nη(t)] if η ≤ 1
4
where E1 denotes expectation under Instance 1. Let R
(i)
T be the regret under Instance i ∈ {1, 2}.
Since r(1)
(1−η
2
)
= 1−η2 D
(1)
(1−η
2
)
= 1−η4 , we have R
(1)
T ≥ η4E1
[
Nη(T )
]
. Using the assumption that
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the seller’s algorithm has a regret smaller than c⋆
√
T , and adapting an argument of Bubeck et al.
[12, Proof of Theorem 5], we can write
η
4
T
4
exp
(
− 4η2E1
[
Nη(T )
]) ≤ max{R(1)T , R(2)T } ≤ c⋆√T .
Hence, for η = 32c
⋆√
T
, it must hold that E1
[
Nη(t)
] ≥ ln 2
4η2
, which implies that R
(1)
T ≥ ln 2512c⋆
√
T .
Theorem 2 can be extended to the case when K is known to the seller. This can be done
by adding an extra valuation v
(1)
3 > v
(1)
2 to Instance 1 which has either vanishing probability p3
or vanishing distance v
(1)
3 − v(1)2 from v(1)2 . (In the latter case the value of v(1)3 depends on the
algorithms.) In both cases the seller algorithm is unlikely to detect the presence of this extra
valuation, and a slight modified proof of Theorem 2 can be applied.
This lower bound shows that
√
T is best possible in the distribution-dependent case even when
K is small and ∆ is a constant. In Section 6 we show how regret bounds can be substantially better
than
√
T when the learner knows the value of the smallest drop in the demand curve.
5 Distribution-free bounds
In this section we focus on distribution-free bounds, i.e., bounds that do not depend on the demand
curve. The regret bound we prove exceeds the theoretical lower bound stated in Section 4 by a
constant term depending only on the distance between adjacent valuations.
Our Algorithm 1 works in two phases: a search phase and a bandit phase. In the search phase a
binary search for all “relevant” valuations is performed. By the end of this phase, a tight estimate
of all such valuations is determined with high probability. During the bandit phase a stochastic
bandit algorithm is run on the estimated valuations. As it turns out, this simple scheme is enough to
ensure an optimal
√
KT convergence up to an additive constant independent of the distribution of
buyer’s valuations. Notably, the algorithm does not need to know K in advance. We call macrostep
a block of consecutive rounds in which the same price is offered consistently. For each price x we
denote by D(x) the fraction of accepted offers of x during the last macrostep in which x was offered.
At the beginning of the search phase, our algorithm receives as input the time horizon T and a
confidence parameter δ. The algorithm then proceeds in macrosteps of length
⌈
8
√
T/km ln δ
−1⌉,
where km is the total number of valuations discovered so far. The goal of the search phase is to
approximately locate all relevant valuations, that is valuations vi whose associated probability pi
is at least 4
√
K/T .
Initially, all relevant valuations belong to [a1, b1] = [0, 1]. The search proceeds as long as there
is at least an interval i containing relevant valuations with length larger than T−1/2 (line 2). When
such an interval i is selected at line 3, a macrostep of binary search is performed and the midpoint
price xm of [ai, bi] is offered for
⌈
8
√
T/km ln δ
−1⌉ rounds (line 4), thus obtaining an estimate of
its demand. If the difference in demands (line 5) is smaller than (km/T )
−1/4/2 no new relevant
valuation is detected. Before eliminating the lower half of the interval (line 7), a test designed to
detect and remove fake arms is performed (line 6). We call fake arm an interval containing no
relevant valuations. Fake arms might be inadvertently allocated when intervals are too wide. In
that case, the comparison between two distant points may reveal a large difference in demands
due to the presence of several nonrelevant valuations in between. If that happens, the fake arm is
removed when the interval becomes small enough (line 8). When no significant difference is detected
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Algorithm 1:
Input: T ∈ N, δ ∈ (0, 1).
Initialization: K1 ← {1}, k1 ← 1, a1 ← 0, b1 ← 1, a0 ← 0, D(0)← 0.
1 for m = 1, 2, . . . do // search phase
2 if {j ∈ Km | bj − aj > T−1/2} 6= ∅ then
3 pick im = min{j ∈ Km | bj − aj > T−1/2};
4 offer price xm = (aim + bim)/2 for
⌈
8
√
T/km ln δ
−1⌉ rounds;
5 if D(aim)−D(xm) < (km/T )1/4/2 then // undershooting
6 if D(xm)−D(bim) ≥ (km/T )1/4/2 then // check for fake arms
7 update aim ← xm, Km+1 ← Km and km+1 ← km;
8 else update Km+1 ← Km \ {im} and km+1 ← km;
9 else if D(aim)−D(xm) ≥ (km/T )1/4/2 then // overshooting
10 if sign(ai − xm)
(
D(ai)−D(xm)
) ≥ (km/T )1/4/2 for all i then // new arms
11 set akm+1 ← xm, bkm+1 ← bim , Km+1 ← Km ∪ {km + 1} and km+1 ← km + 1;
12 update bim ← xm, Km+1 ← Km and km+1 ← km;
13 else denote the last macrostep by M and break;
14 run the UCB1 algorithm on the set of prices {aj}j∈KM ; // bandit phase
between the demands, all relevant valuations in [ai, bi] remain in [xm, bi] with high probability after
the update. If, on the other hand, a difference between demands is detected (line 9), two things
happen. First, a test is performed to detect possible new relevant valuations (line 10). If a new
relevant valuation is spotted, a new interval [xm, bi] is allocated. Second, the upper half of the
interval [ai, bi] is removed. If [ai, bi] is split into [ai, xm] and [xm, bi], all relevant valuations are split
between the two intervals. If [ai, bi] is simply updated as [ai, xm]—since no significant difference
was detected between the demands at xm and bi—all relevant valuations in [ai, bi] remain in [ai, xm]
with high probability.
When all intervals become smaller than T−1/2 (line 13), the search phase ends and all intervals
[ai, bi] are returned. At this point each relevant valuation is contained in one of the intervals with
high probability. Therefore the algorithm has now access to T−1/2-close approximations of all of
them, and the bandit phase begins. In the bandit phase, the algorithm UCB1 [3] is run on the set
of left endpoints of the intervals (line 14).
Theorem 3. If Algorithm 1 is run on an unknown number K of pairs (v1, p1), . . . , (vK , pK) with
input parameter δ = T−2, then its regret satisfies
RT = O˜
(√
KT
)
+ V (V + 1) where V = max
i∈{1,...,K}
v4k
(vi − vi−1)5 .
We actually prove a slightly improved bound, in which the constant V (V + 1) is replaced by
the smaller term K(v4K/v
4
1)
(
1 + (v4K/c
4)
)
, where c = mini∈{2,...,K}{vi − vi−1}. To give a frame of
reference, previously known upper bounds for discontinuous demand curves [16] are at best of order(
K20/c18
)√
T , where v1 is assumed to be bounded away from zero and K needs to be known in
advance.
Proof. We begin by proving that at any time time during the search phase, all intervals [ai, bi]
satisfy D(bi) −D(ai) ≥ T−1/4 with high probability and with the same probability all valuations
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vj not belonging to any of these intervals satisfy pj < (K/T )
1/4. For any given price x ∈ [0, 1]
offered during the search phase, Hoeffding’s inequality implies
∣∣D(x) − D(x)∣∣ ≤ (|Km|/T )1/4/4
with probability at least 1 − 2δ. Therefore, if D(x) − D(y) ≥ (|Km|/T )1/4, then D(x) − D(y) ≥
(|Km|/T )1/4/2 with probability at least 1 − 2δ. Moreover, if D(x) = D(y), then D(x) − D(y) <
(|Km|/T )1/4/2 with probability at least 1 − 4δ. Since at each macrostep the algorithm performs
at most K + 1 comparisons between D(x) and D(y) for pairs of points x, y (lines 5, 6, 10), the
probability that, for at least one of these comparisons, we have(
D(x)−D(y) < 4
√
km
16T ∧ D(x)−D(y) ≥ 4
√
km
T
)
or
(
D(x)−D(y) ≥ 4
√
km
16T ∧ D(x) = D(y)
)
(2)
is at most 4(K + 1)δ. Thus the probability that the event (2) occurs for at least one comparison
in at least one macrostep is at most 4(K +1)Mδ, where M ≤ √KT . This proves the initial claim.
By paying an additional 4(K + 1)MδT = O(K√K/T ) we can therefore assume that event (2)
never occurs. In this case at most K binary searches are performed and —ignoring constants and
logarithmic factors— the regret increases by at most
∑K
k=1
√
T/k ≤ √T ∫K0 x−1/2dx = 2√KT. We
prove now that if vK /∈
⋃
j∈KM [aj , bj ] (which implies pK <
4
√
K/T ), then it is suboptimal. In order
for vK to be optimal, it would have to have at least a revenue higher than v1. Thus
vKpK ≥ v1 =⇒ 4
√
K/T > pK ≥ v1
vK
which can only happen if T < K(vK/v1)
4. By paying an additionalK(vK/v1)
4 term in the regret we
can therefore assume that vK is suboptimal. We show now that all other valuations not belonging
to
⋃
j∈KM [aj , bj ] are also suboptimal. Take any valuation vj /∈
⋃
i∈KM [ai, bi] (which again, implies
pj <
4
√
K/T ) strictly smaller than vK . In order for vj to be optimal, it has to at least be better
than v1 and vj + 1. If vj is better than v1
vj
K∑
k=j
pk ≥ v1 =⇒ pj+1 ≥ v1
vj
− pj −
K∑
k=j+2
pk. (3)
If vj is better than vj+1
vj
K∑
k=j
pk ≥ vj+1
K∑
k=j+1
pk =⇒ pj ≥
(
vj+1
vj
− 1
) K∑
k=j+1
pk =
(
vj+1
vj
− 1
)pj+1 + K∑
k=j+2
pk

and lower bounding pj+1 as in (3) gives
pj ≥
(
vj+1
vj
− 1
)(
v1
vj
− pj
)
=⇒ pj ≥ v1
vj+1
vj+1 − vj
vj
≥ v1c
v2K
where c = mini∈{2,...,K}{vi − vi−1}. Being pj < 4
√
K/T this can only happen if T < Kv8K/(v1c)
4.
Thus we can assume vj is suboptimal by paying at most an extra Kv
8
K/(v1c)
4 term in the regret.
This proves that v⋆ ∈ ⋃j∈KM [aj , bj ]. Being bj − aj < T−1/2, offering aj rather than any x ∈ [aj , bj ]
results in an regret increase of at most
√
T . Finally, running the UCB1 algorithm [3] for standard
stochastic bandits adds another O˜(√kmT ) term to the regret, where again km ≤ K.
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We now discuss the role that c and v1 play in the dynamic pricing problem. Assume that
pi⋆ <
4
√
K/T but there exist valuations vj > v
⋆ with pj ≥ 4
√
K/T , and let vk be the smallest of
such valuations. Arguing as in the proof of Theorem 3, one can prove that dk = vk−v⋆ must satisfy
dk ≤
v2K
v1
K
4
√
K
T
.
This means that in principle the optimum valuation v⋆ could be hiding in any of the intervals
[vi − di, vi − c), where vi are all valuations with probabilities pi ≥ 4
√
K/T . Since these intervals
become bigger and bigger as c approaches zero, this behavior foils the attempt of identifying the
finite support of the problem instance. The smallest valuation v1 is also a natural parameter
of the problem for an entirely different reason. Indeed v1 is not just a valuation, it is the only
valuation which is also its own revenue. Assume for example that v1 = 0 (which makes it always
suboptimal). Even if this piece of information is known by the seller, and the problem is reduced
to {v2, . . . , vK} ⊂ (0, 1], the reduced problem becomes harder as the “weights” {p2, . . . , pK} do
not sum to 1 anymore. The worst case happens when p1 is close to 1. In this case a considerable
amount of samples is needed just to locate any of the remaining valuations, let alone the optimal
one, in an online fashion, while accruing regret at each round.
6 Distribution-dependent bounds
In this section we focus on distribution-dependent bounds, i.e., bounds that are parameterised in
terms of the demand curve. Our algorithm ignores the number of valuations, but is given a lower
bound γ on the smallest probability pmin of a valuation (i.e., the smallest drop in the demand)—note
that γ ≤ pmin implies K ≤ 1/γ, so we also have an upper bound on the number of valuations. The
regret bound we prove exceeds the distribution-dependent regret (K lnT )/∆ of standard stochastic
bandits by a term of order K(lnT )(ln lnT )/γ2. On the other hand, if the number K of valuations
(counting only those which are at least T−1 apart) is exactly known, it is easy to prove an excess
regret bound of order K((lnT )/pmin)
2 even when pmin (or a lower bound on it) is unknown: The
algorithm performs O(ln T ) binary search steps for each one of the K valuations, repeating each
step O((lnT )/γ2) times and using a value of γ that decreases geometrically until all K valuations
are found. A similar argument gives the same regret bound in the case when K not known exactly,
but γ ≤ pmin and c ≤ mink(pk − pk−1) are both known.
In order to introduce in a clear and concise manner the ideas used to prove our main result, we
begin by considering an easier setting in which the feedback is provided by an oracle returning the
value of the demand curve D(Xt) at the posted price Xt. This is equivalent to assuming that the
feedback is the expectation E
[
rt(Xt) | V1, . . . , Vt−1
]
= XtD(Xt) rather than the random variable
rt(Xt). This simplified setting allows us to focus on the search of the valuations points, abstracting
from the problem of estimating the demand curve. We define a seller algorithm that extends the
“cautious search” strategy for a single unknown valuation ([20], see Algorithm 4 in Appendix B)
to an unknown number of unknown valuations.
Our algorithm (Algorithm 2) initially looks for a single valuation v1, and then allocates searches
for new valuations incrementally. Whenever a new value of the demand curve is observed, provid-
ing evidence for the existence of a i-th previously unseen valuation, an interval [ai, bi] (which we
associate with a bandit arm) and a step size εi are allocated. The interval [ai, bi] estimates the
smallest valuation vi contained in it. By construction of the algorithm, vi is never removed from
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Algorithm 2:
Input: Time horizon T ∈ N.
Initialization: set κ0 ← 1, a1 ← 0, b1 ← 1, n1 ← 1, ε1 ← 1/2, D1 ← 1.
1 for t = 1 to T do
2 set κt ← κt−1;
3 compute it ← argmaxi≤κt biDi; // greedy pick
4 if bit − ait ≤ 1/T then post ait ; // if [ait , bit ] becomes tiny, play ait for good
5 else
6 post Xt = ait + nitεit and get feedback XtD(Xt);
7 if D(Xt) = Dit then // increase prices until surpassing the closest vj
8 if Xt + εit < bit then update nit ← nit + 1;
9 else update ait ← Xt, nit ← 1, εit ← ε2it ; // shrink the interval
10 else
11 if D(Xt) /∈ {D1, . . . ,Dκt , 0} then // a new valuation is found
12 set κt ← κt−1 + 1, aκt ← Xt, bκt ← bit , nκt ← 1, εκt ← εit , Dκt ← D(Xt);
13 update ait ← Xt − εit , bit ← Xt, nit ← 1, εit ← ε2it ; // shrink the interval
[ai, bi] when the interval shrinks. This implies that the more [ai, bi] shrinks, the closer biD(ai) gets
to the true revenue viD(vi).
The algorithm works by performing cautious searches within each interval. At the beginning,
all valuations belong to [a1, b1] = [0, 1]. Whenever an interval is selected (line 3), a step of cautious
search is performed (lines 6–13). During a cautious search in [ai, bi] with step size εi, the sequence
of values Xt = ai + kεi for k ∈ {1, 2, . . . } is posted until a change is spotted in the demand or Xt
gets within εi of bi. If the latter happens before a change in the demand is discovered (line 8), the
interval shrinks to [Xt, bit ] and the step size is refined (line 9). Note that the shrunken interval
contains all valuations that were in [ai, bi] because the demand did not change. If a change in the
demand is spotted (line 10), then the interval shrinks to [Xt − εi,Xt] and the step size is reduced
(line 13). If the new demand value matches the value of D(bi) the shrunken interval contains again
all valuations that were in [ai, bi]. If the new demand value does not belong to a known interval
(line 11), then a new interval [Xt, bi] is allocated (line 12). This process continues until the length of
the feasible interval [aj , bj ] of the arm j with the highest bjDj is less than 1/T . Then the seller offers
the same price aj for all remaining rounds. As time goes by, the number κ of discovered valuations
grows until possibly reaching the actual number of valuations K. Simultaneously, each estimate
biDi converges to the revenue of the smallest valuation in the interval. After enough rounds,
picking the interval i with the highest biDi becomes equivalent to choosing a 1/T -approximation
of an optimal valuation. Without loss of generality, in the analysis of the algorithm, we assume
all valuations v1, . . . , vK are at least 1/T apart. Let is be the index of the arm chosen at time s
(line 3). For any k = {1, . . . ,K}, let Tk ∈
{
t ≤ T | vk ∈ [ait , bit ]
}
. The next lemma states that the
steps performed by Algorithm 2 in all the intervals that ever contained vk are those that a cautious
search would have performed if run on the single evaluation vk.
Lemma 1. Suppose Algorithm 2 is run on K valuations v1, . . . , vK . Pick k ∈ {1, . . . ,K} and
n ∈ {1, . . . , |Tk|}. Let [0, 1] ≡ I1 ⊇ · · · ⊇ In ≡ [a′n, b′n] be the sequence of the first n intervals
computed by n steps of a cautious search for the single valuation vk with initial interval [0, 1]. Then
a′n ≤ ait and b′n = bit, where t is the n-th smallest value in Tk. Moreover, the price Xt offered by
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Algorithm 2 at time t is equal to the n-th price offered by the cautious search for the single valuation
vk.
Proof. Fix a valuation vk. Let A be Algorithm 2 and C be the cautious search for vk. The proof is
by induction on n. Since A and C both start with interval [0, 1] and price 1/2 the statement holds
for n = 1. Now let t be the (n+ 1)-st smallest value in Tk and let s be the largest value in Tk that
is smaller than t. Let In ≡ [a′n, b′n] be the n-th interval computed by C. By induction, a′n ≤ ais ,
b′n = bis , and Xs is offered by both A and C. The only interesting case to discuss is when the test
at line 7 is false. There are two subcases: if the test at line 11 is false, then it must be Xs > vk.
In this case C overshoots and the interval is updated exactly in the same way by C and A (see
line 13). If the test at line 11 is true, then it must be vi < Xs ≤ vk. This is not an overshoot for
C, so In+1 ≡ In. A, however, creates a new interval [a, b] —containing vk— with a = Xs, b = bis ,
and unchanged step size εis . The next time t this new interval is selected, the price Xt offered by
A is the same as the price offered by C because the step size did not change.
Theorem 4. If Algorithm 2 is run on an unknown number K of pairs (v1, p1), . . . , (vK , pK), then
its regret satisfies RT ≤ K(3 ln lnT + 10).
Proof. Intervals are indexed in their order of creation (so that interval 1 is [0, 1]), and the i-th
interval is identified with bandit arm i. Note that, at any point during the execution of the
algorithm, each valuation belongs to some interval. Any interval is created with at least one
valuation in it, and shrinks until it only contains the smallest valuation vj among those that initially
belonged to it. Let κT be the number of intervals created after T rounds. For i ∈ {1, . . . , κT },
denote by µ(i) the index j ∈ {1, . . . ,K} of the smallest vj ∈ [ai, bi]. Now fix any k such that
k = µ(j) (i.e., vk is the smallest value of the j-th interval) for some j ∈ {1, . . . , κT }. Note that
j = itk for some tk ∈ {1, . . . , T} because k = µ(j) implies that when interval j is created vk is
its smallest valuation. Hence the last selected interval containing vk must be j. Let Tk = |Tk|
and tk = max Tk. Lemma 1 implies that at time tk the overall number of cautious steps made
for vk is Tk, Lemma 5 implies bj − aj ≤ 2/Tk at time tk. Now note that Dj = D(vk) because
k = µ(j). Since v⋆ belongs to some [ai⋆ , bi⋆ ], and using Di⋆ = D(ai⋆), at time tk we have v
⋆D(v⋆) ≤
bi⋆Di⋆ ≤ bjDj = bjD(vk) ≤
(
vk + (bj − aj)
)
D(vk). Then the above implies Tk ≤ 2D(vk)/∆k where
∆k = v
⋆D(v⋆)− vkD(vk). Lemma 4 and Lemma 1 also imply∑
t∈Tk
(
rt(vk)− rt(Xt)
) ≤ 3 ln lnTk + 8 . (4)
Noting that {1, . . . , T} ⊆ T1 ∪ . . . ∪ TK , we may write
RT =
T∑
t=1
(
rt
(
v⋆
)− rt(Xt)) ≤ K∑
k=1
∑
t∈Tk
(
rt
(
v⋆
)− rt(Xt))
≤
K∑
k=1
(
Tkv
⋆D
(
v⋆
)− (TkvkD(vk)− (3 ln lnTk + 8)))
=
K∑
k=1
(
Tk∆k + 3 ln lnTk + 8
) ≤ K∑
k=1
(
2D(vk) + 3 ln lnTk + 8
) ≤ K(10 + 3 ln lnT )
concluding the proof.
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Algorithm 3:
Input: Time horizon T ∈ N, confidence parameter δ ∈ (0, 1).
Initialization: set κ0 = 1, a1 ← 0, b1 ← 1, n1 ← 1, ε1 ← 1/2, D(a1) = 1.
1 for m = 1 to Mγ do
2 set κm ← κm−1;
3 compute im ← argmaxi≤κm biUi; // greedy pick
4 if bim − aim ≤ 1/T then post aim ; // if [aim , bim ] gets tiny, play aim for good
5 else
6 post Xm = aim + nimεim for
⌈
8 ln(δ−1)/γ2
⌉
rounds and compute D(Xm);
7 if D(aim)−D(Xm) < γ/2 then // up prices until surpassing the closest vj
8 if Xm + εim < bim then update nim ← nim + 1;
9 else update aim ← Xm, nim ← 0, εim ← ε2im ; // shrink the interval
10 else (denoting a0 = D(0) = 0)
11 if ∀i 6= im, sign(ai −Xm)
(
D(ai)−D(Xm)
) ≥ γ/2 then // new valuation
12 κm ← κm−1 + 1, aκm ← Xm, bκm ← bim , nκm ← 1, εκm ← εim ;
13 update aim ← Xm − εim , bim ← Xm, nim ← 0, εim ← ε2im ; // shrink interval
Next, we extend Algorithm 2 to account for the fact that the actual feedback at time t is the
random variable rt(Xt) rather than its conditional expectation XtD(Xt). The main intuition is
very simple: in order to estimate D(x) we divide time in blocks (called again macrosteps) of equal
length, and build an estimate D(x) by posting the same price x within each block. In order to
decide which arm i to use in each macrostep, we compute an upper confidence bound Ui on the
average demand in the i-th interval, and then select the arm attaining the highest of such bounds.
Our algorithm receives as input the time horizon T , a lower bound γ on pmin = mini pi, and
a confidence parameter δ. Given these parameters, the number of macrosteps is defined as the
biggest Mγ ∈ N satisfying T ≥Mγ⌈8 ln(δ−1)/γ2⌉. The fraction of accepted offers of price x during
the m-th macrostep (in which x is offered) is denoted by Dm(x). Our algorithm (Algorithm 3) is
very similar to Algorithm 2, so we only highlight the main differences.
First, note that references to steps t are replaced by references to macrosteps m; in particular,
κm is the number of allocated intervals after m macrosteps. In line 3, the selected arm im is now the
one maximizing, over intervals [ai, bi], the product biUi. The quantity Ui is the upper confidence
bound
Ui = D̂m(i) +
1
bi
√
ln(δ−1)
Nm(i)
where Nm(i) is
⌈
8γ−2 ln δ−1
⌉
(if i > 1, which takes into account the macrostep in which interval
i was allocated) plus the total number of times that i was picked in the first m − 1 macrosteps,
ignoring the steps occurring in all macrosteps when line 13 was executed. D̂m(i) is the fraction of
accepted offers during these Nm(i) steps. In line 7, a new valuation is detected when the difference
between demands is bigger than γ/2. Finally, in line 11 a new interval is allocated if the newly
discovered demand differs from all previously detected demands by at least γ/2.
Theorem 5. If Algorithm 3 is run on an unknown number K of pairs (v1, p1) . . . , (vK , pK) with
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input parameters γ ≤ mink pk and δ = T−2, then its regret satisfies
RT ≤
∑
i : ∆i>0
4 lnT
∆i
+O
(
K lnT
γ2
ln lnT
)
.
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume MγBγ = T where Bγ ≥ 8 ln(δ−1)/γ2 is the length of a
macrostep. Hence, for any given price 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, Hoeffding’s inequality implies ∣∣D(x)−D(x)∣∣ ≤ γ/4
with probability at least 1 − 2δ. Therefore, if D(x) − D(y) ≥ γ, then D(x) − D(y) ≥ γ/2 with
probability at least 1 − 4δ. Moreover, if D(x) = D(y), then D(x) −D(y) ≤ γ/2 with probability
at least 1 − 4δ. Since at each macrostep of the algorithm we perform at most K + 1 comparisons
between D(x) and D(y) for pairs of points x, y (lines 7 and 11), the probability that, for at least
one of these comparisons, we have(∣∣Dm(x)−Dm(y)∣∣ < γ
2
∧ |D(x)−D(y)| ≥ γ
)
or
(
|Dm(x)−Dm(y)| > γ
2
∧ D(x) = D(y)
)
(5)
is at most 4(K + 1)δ. Let B the event that (5) occurs for at least one comparison in at least one
macrostep. Then P(B) ≤ 4(K + 1)Mγδ.
Assume B does not occur. Recall that vµ(i) is the smallest valuation in [ai, bi]. Since pµ(i) ≥ γ by
hypothesis, event Xm > vµ(i) implies that the test in line 7 is false, and therefore line 13 is executed.
Therefore, assuming event (5) never occurs, the macrosteps of Algorithm 3 with feedback rt(Xt)
are equivalent to the steps of Algorithm 2 run with feedback XtD(Xt). In particular, Lemma 1
applies to the macrosteps of Algorithm 3.
Let nm(i) be the number of macrosteps (in the first m − 1 macrosteps) where i was picked.
Similarly, let osm(i) be the number of macrosteps (in the first m − 1 macrosteps) when i was
picked and Xm > vµ(i). Then we have Nm(i) = Bγ
(
nm(i) − osm(i)
)
. Now note that D̂m(i) is the
sample mean of a Bernoulli of parameter D(vµ(i)) because it is computed over Nm(i) points sampled
between ai and vµ(i). Fix a suboptimal valuation vk and a macrostep m such that µ(im) = k. Let
i⋆ be such that v⋆ ∈ [ai⋆ , bi⋆]. Then,
im 6= i⋆ =⇒ bi⋆Ui⋆ ≤ bimUim
⇐⇒
(
bi⋆D̂m(i
⋆) +
√
ln(δ−1)
Nm(i⋆)
)
≤
(
bimD̂m(im) +
√
ln(δ−1)
Nm(im)
)
=⇒
(
v⋆D̂m(i
⋆) +
√
ln(δ−1)
Nm(i⋆)
)
≤
((
vk +
2
nm(im)
)
D̂m(im) +
√
ln(δ−1)
Nm(im)
)
where in the last step we used Lemma 5 in Appendix B. Now recall that nm(im) ≥ Nm(im)/Bγ .
Hence,
im 6= i⋆ =⇒
(
v⋆D̂m(i
⋆) +
√
ln(δ−1)
Nm(i⋆)
)
≤
(
vkD̂m(im) +
2Bγ
Nm(im)
+
√
ln(δ−1)
Nm(im)
)
.
Observe that E
[
D̂m(i
⋆)
]
= D
(
vµ(i⋆)
) ≥ D(v⋆) and E[D̂m(im)] = D(vk). Moreover, the two quanti-
ties
√(
ln(δ−1)
)/(
Nm(i⋆)
)
and 2Bγ/Nm(im) +
√(
ln(δ−1)
)/(
Nm(im)
)
play the role of upper con-
fidence bounds for the estimates v⋆D̂m(i
⋆) and vkD̂m(im). Therefore, we can apply a modification
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of the analysis of UCB1 [3, Proof of Theorem 1] to K arms with reward expectations vkD(vk) for
k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, and such that the upper confidence bound for any suboptimal arm k is inflated by
2Bγ/Nm(im). (In fact Lemma 6 in Appendix C is stronger than what we need, because v
⋆ always
belongs to some interval [aj⋆ , bj⋆ ] but not all suboptimal valuations vk are the smallest valuation of
the interval [ajk , bjk ] they belong to.) In particular, recalling that Bγ = 8(ln(δ
−1))/γ2 and recalling
also our assumption in B, we apply Lemma 6 in Appendix C with α = 16. This gives
Bγ E
I{B} ∑
m : µ(im)=k
I {im 6= i⋆}
 ≤ 1 +((δT )2 + 64
γ2
)
2K ln(δ−1) +
∑
k : ∆k>0
4 ln(δ−1)
∆k
.
where ∆k = v
⋆D(i⋆) − vkD(vk) > 0 and B is the complement of B.2 Because Lemma 6 bounds
the number of steps in which a suboptimal arm is selected, we multiplied by Bγ the right-hand
side of the above, thus converting macrosteps m in steps t. The fact that we prevent the algorithm
from switching arm within each macrostep is not an issue. Indeed, the proof of the Lemma works
irrespective to whether the decision of pulling a different arm is made at every macrostep as opposed
to every step. In particular, the proof establishes that after each suboptimal arm is selected order
of (lnT )/γ2 times, corresponding to a constant number of macrosteps, the probability of pulling
any suboptimal arm ever again becomes tiny, of order T−2.
Similarly to the proof of Theorem 4, introduce Mk =
{
m ≤ Mγ | vk ∈ [aim , bim ]
}
. As argued
above, we may apply Lemma 1 to the macrosteps of Algorithm 3. Hence, bound (4) applies with
Tk replaced by Mk. Therefore, with probability at least 1 − 4(K + 1)Mγδ, the regret over the T
steps (recall that we repeatedly post the same price in each step of a macrostep) is bounded by
BγE
 Mγ∑
m=1
(
v⋆D(v⋆)−XmD(Xm)
)
≤ BγE
 K∑
k=1
∑
m :µ(im)=k
(
v⋆D(v⋆)− vkD(vk)
)
+
K∑
k=1
∑
m∈Mk
(
vkD(vk)−XmD(Xm)
)
≤ Bγ
K∑
k=1
∆kE
I{B} ∑
m :µ(im)=k
I {im 6= i⋆}
+ TP(B) +Bγ K∑
k=1
(
3 ln lnTk + 8
)
(using (4))
≤ 1 +
(
(δT )2 +
64
γ2
)
2K ln(δ−1) +
∑
k : ∆k>0
4 ln(δ−1)
∆k
+ TP(B) +BγK
(
3 ln lnT + 8
)
. (6)
Finally, in order to bound TP(B) ≤ 4(K + 1)TMγδ = (K + 1)(Tγ)2δ/(2 ln δ−1), it is sufficient to
set δ = T−2.
We conclude this section by discussing the case of at most two valuations. We design an
algorithm with regret of order log(T )/∆+ log(T ) log log(T ), which is (up to the log log term) as if
the exact values of v1 and v2 were known in advance! This is achieved by leveraging some properties
of the smallest and the biggest valuation. For example, any offer of a price lower or equal to v1 is
deterministically accepted and all offers above v2 are always rejected. If on the other hand a price
2 The factor I
{
B
}
inside the expectation is needed to reduce the problem to an instance of a standard stochastic
bandit. It can be conveniently dropped in the analysis of Lemma 6.
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x ∈ (v1, v2] is offered, the probability that that price is accepted is exactly p2, which is enough to
reconstruct the entire distribution (p1, p2) on {v1, v2}. Furthermore, the suboptimality gap ∆ is
always equal to |v1 − p2v2|.
Other than the result itself, we believe the techniques used in designing and analyzing the
algorithm could be of interest on their own. Theorem 9 in particular gives a way to compute a high-
probability multiplicative estimate of the unknown expectation µ > 0 of any [0, 1]-valued random
variable using only O( 1µ) samples. We now state the result. All the details about the algorithm
and its subroutines, their pseudocodes, and the remaining theoretical results are presented in
Appendix D.
Theorem 6. If Algorithm 8 (see Appendix D) is run with input parameter δ = T−2 on an unknown
instance (v1, p1) and (v2, p2), then its regret satisfies RT = O
(
log(T )/∆+(log T )(log log T )
)
, where
the first term is zero when ∆ = |p2v2 − v1| is zero.
7 Conclusions
In this work we initiated an investigation of stochastic dynamic pricing in a setting in which the
distribution of buyers’ private values is supported on a finite set of points in [0, 1], where the number
and location of these points is unknown to the seller. We studied the seller’s regret in distribution-
free and distribution-dependent settings, proving upper and lower bounds that show interesting
connections to both the dynamic pricing setting of Kleinberg and Leighton [20] and the standard
stochastic K-armed bandit setting. We also proved some preliminary results for the nonstochastic
version of our model when there are two valuations but only one is unknown (Appendix E).
Our work leaves some interesting questions open. Can we prove a distribution-free upper bound
of order
√
KT that does not depend on the locations of buyers’ valuations? Can we prove a
distribution-dependent upper bound without any prior knowledge at all for K larger than two?
Can we obtain a
√
KT regret bound in the nonstochastic setting when K ≥ 2 and all valuations
are unknown?
A Lower Bound
In this section we prove the lower bounds (Theorems 1 and 2) stated in Section 4. Kleinberg
and Leighton [20] showed that RT = Ω(T
2/3) if T ≤ K3 by building a distribution over a set of
ε-spaced valuations v1, . . . , vK ∈
[
1
2 , 1
]
. A key technical property needed in their proof is that
KL
(
1
2v ,
9
10
1
2v +
1
10
1
2(v−ε)
) ≤ cε2 for some constant c independent of ε and for all v ≥ 3/4. We begin
by showing that such construction only works if K is large compared to T .
Lemma 2. For all K ≥ 1, for all ε ∈ (0, 12K ], and for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, denoting v = 12 + kε,
KL
(
1
2v
∥∥∥ 9
10
1
2v
+
1
10
1
2(v − ε)
)
>
ε
800k
.
Proof. Fix any K ≥ 1, ε ∈ (0, 12K ], and k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}. Denoting v = 12 + kε,
KL
(
1
2v
∥∥∥ 9
10
1
2v
+
1
10
1
2(v − ε)
)
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=
1
2v
ln
(
1
2v
9
10
1
2v +
1
10
1
2(v−ε)
)
+
(
1− 1
2v
)
ln
 1− 12v
1−
[
9
10
1
2v +
1
10
1
2(v−ε)
]

=
1
2v
ln
(
1
1 + ε10(v−ε)
)
+
1
2v
(2v − 1) ln
(
2v − 1
2v − 1− ε10(v−ε)
)
≥ 1
2
[
− ln
(
1 +
ε
5 + 10(k − 1)ε
)
− 2kε ln
(
1− 1
10k + 20k(k − 1)ε
)]
(using v = 12 + kε ≤ 1)
=
1
2
+∞∑
n=1
2kε
(
1
10k+20k(k−1)ε
)n
+
(
− ε5+10(k−1)ε
)n
n
=
ε
8k
(
5 + 10(k − 1)ε)2 + ε
2
4
(
5 + 10(k − 1)ε)2 + 12
+∞∑
n=3
2kε
(
1
10k+20k(k−1)ε
)n
+
(
− ε5+10(k−1)ε
)n
n
>
ε
800k
+
ε2
400
+ ε
+∞∑
n=3
1
kn−1
1(
10+20(k−1)ε
)n + (−1)nεn−12 1(5+10(k−1)ε)n
n
=
ε
800k
+
ε2
400
+ ε
+∞∑
n=3
1(
10+20(k−1)ε
)n ( 1kn−1 + (−1)n(2ε)n−1)
n
>
ε
800k
+
ε2
400
+ ε
+∞∑
n=3
1(
10+20(k−1)ε
)n ( 1kn−1 − (2ε)n−1)
n
≥ ε
800k
+
ε2
400
. (using k ≤ K and ε ≤ 12K )
This concludes the proof.
In order to prove Theorem 1, we need the following lemma.
Lemma 3. For all p, q ∈ (0, 1)
KL (p ‖ q) ≤ (p− q)
2
q(1− q) .
In particular, for all x ∈ (0, 1) and all α ∈ [0, 1− x),
KL
(
x ‖ x+ α) ≤ α2
(x+ α)(1 − x− α) . (7)
Proof. Fix any p, q ∈ (0, 1). Using ln(x) ≤ x− 1 for all x > 0,
KL(p ‖ q) = p ln
(
p
q
)
+ (1− p) ln
(
1− p
1− q
)
≤ pp− q
q
− (1− p)p− q
1− q
= (p − q)
(
p
q
− 1− p
1− q
)
=
(p− q)2
q(1− q) .
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We now restate and prove Theorem 1.
Theorem 7. For any number of valuations K ≥ 3 and all time horizons T ≥ K3 there exist K
pairs
(
v1, p(v1)
)
, . . . ,
(
vK , p(vK)
)
such that the expected regret of any pricing strategy satisfies
RT ≥ 1
375
√
KT .
Proof. For notational convenience, fix K ≥ 2 and define the set {v0, . . . , vK} of K + 1 valuations
by
vi =
1
2
+
i
2K
, ∀i ∈ {0, . . . ,K} .
Define the distribution p0 on {v0, . . . , vK} of the random variable V0 by
P(V0 ≥ v) =
∑
i : vi≥v
p0(vi) =
1
2v
, ∀v ∈ {v0, . . . , vK} .
With this choice of demand curve, vP(V0 ≥ v) = 1/2, i.e., each valuation v has the same expected
revenue. Furthermore, the distribution v 7→ p0(v) satisfies the following: p0(v0) = 1K+1 ; p0 decreases
monotonically on {v0, . . . , vK−1}, p0(vK−1) = 12K−1 , and p0(vK) = 1/2. Therefore
1
2K
≤ p0(v) ≤ 1
K
, ∀v ∈ {v0, . . . , vK−1} . (8)
Now, for each j ∈ {⌈K/2⌉, . . . ,K}, define the distribution pj by slightly lowering the probability
of vj−1 and upping the probability of vj by the same amount:
pj (vi) =

p0(vi), i ∈ {0, . . . ,K} \ {j − 1, j},
(1− 4Kε)p0(vj−1), i = j − 1,
p0(vj) + 4Kεp0(vj−1), i = j,
(9)
where ε ∈ (0, 140) is a small constant determined below. Note that if the buyers’ valuations were
distributed as pj, all valuations v 6= vj would have expected revenue 12 , but vj whould have expected
revenue at least 12+ε because of (8) and (9). In order to define the distribution of buyers’ valuations
V =
(
V1, . . . , VT
)
, let J be uniformly distributed over
{⌈K/2⌉, . . . ,K} (that is, the set of indices
i ∈ {1, . . . ,K} such that vi ≥ 34). The value of J will give the “good valuation”, that is the
valuation with the highest expected revenue. For all t, the distribution of Vt is determined by
P
(
Vt = vi | J = j
)
= pj(vi), ∀i ∈ {0, . . . ,K},∀j ∈
{⌈K/2⌉, . . . ,K} .
Denoting the seller’s randomized strategy by X = (X1, . . . ,XT ) and applying Fubini’s theorem, we
obtain
RT = max
k∈{0,...,K}
EXEJ,V
[
T∑
t=1
rt(vk)−
T∑
t=1
rt(Xt)
]
.
According to the previous identity, we can (an will!) lower bound the internal expectation assuming
that the seller’s strategy is deterministic. Furthermore, assume that the seller’s pricing strategy
only offers prices in {v⌈K/2⌉, . . . , vK} —since it is counterproductive to offer a price outside of it as
17
all other valuations (v1, . . . , v⌈K/2⌉−1 in particular) have smaller expected revenues. Now let Ni be
the number of times the seller offer valuation vi,
Ni =
T∑
t=1
I{Xt = vi} .
By construction, each time the seller picks the “good valuation”, no regret is accrued; all other
times at least ε is lost. Therefore
EJ,V
[
T∑
t=1
rt(vk)−
T∑
t=1
rt(Xt)
]
≥ ε(T − EJ,V [NJ ]) . (10)
Denote by Yt the Bernoulli random variable I{V t ≥ Xt} which is 1 if and only if the t-th buyer
accepted the price offered, Y t = (Y1, . . . , Yt), and Y = Y
T . Denote by q0 the distribution of Y if
buyer’s valuations were distributed as p0 and by qi the distribution of Y if buyer’s valuations were
distributed as pi. For any deterministic function f : {0, 1}T → [0,M ],
EV
[
f(Y ) | J = i]− E0[f(Y )] = ∑
bT∈{0,1}T
f(bT )
(
qi(b
T )− q0(bT )
)
≤
∑
bT∈{0,1}T
qi(b
T )>q0(bT )
f(bT )
(
qi(b
T )− q0(bT )
)
≤M
∑
bT∈{0,1}T
qi(bT )>q0(bT )
(
qi(b
T )− q0(bT )
)
≤M
√
1
2
KL(q0 ‖ qi)
where E0 is the expectation with respect to distribution p0 and in the last step we used Pinsker’s
inequality. Let qi(bt | bt−1) = pi (Yt = bt | Y1 = b1, . . . , Yt−1 = bt−1) and let q0(bt | bt−1) be defined
similarly. By the chain rule of the relative entropy
KL(q0 ‖ qi) =
T∑
t=1
q0(b
t−1)
∑
bt−1∈{0,1}t−1
KL
(
q0(bt | bt−1) ‖ qi(bt | bt−1)
)
=
T∑
t=1
q0(b
t−1)
∑
bt−1 : Xt(bt−1)6=vi
KL
(
q0(bt | bt−1) ‖ qi(bt | bt−1)
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
+
T∑
t=1
q0(b
t−1)
∑
bt−1 : Xt(bt−1)=vi
KL
(
q0(bt | bt−1) ‖ qi(bt | bt−1)
)
where the relative entropy is zero when Xt 6= vi because in that case pi(Yt = 1) = p0(Yt = 1). If on
the other hand, Xt = vi, for all vi ≥ 34 ,
KL
(
q0(bt | bt−1) ‖ qi(bt | bt−1)
)
= KL
(
1
2vi
∥∥∥ 1
2vi
+ 4Kεp0(vj−1)
)
≤ 108ε2
18
where the last inequality follows by (8) and KL
(
x ‖ x + α) ≤ α2(x+ α)−1(1− x− α)−1, with
x = 12vi ∈
[
1
2 ,
2
3
]
and α = 4Kεp0(vj−1) ∈ [2ε, 4ε]. Therefore
KL(q0 ‖ qi) ≤ 108ε2
T∑
t=1
q0(b
t−1)
∑
bt−1 : Xt(bt−1)=vi
1 = 108ε2
T∑
t=1
p0(Xt = vi) = 108ε
2
E0[Ni] ,
where again, E0 is the expectation with respect to distribution p0. This gives
EV [f(Y ) | J = i] ≤ E0[f(Y )] + εM
√
54E0[Ni] .
Then, being for any deterministic online pricing strategy the random variable Ni a deterministic
function of Y , EV [Ni | J = i] ≤ E0[Ni] + εT
√
54E0[Ni]. Thus, using Jensen inequality, EJ,V [Ni] ≤
EJE0[NJ ] + εT
√
54EJE0[NJ ]. Using again Jensen inequality, Fubini’s Theorem, and inequality
(10),
EJ,V EX
[
T∑
t=1
rt(vk)−
T∑
t=1
rt(Xt)
]
≥ ε
(
T − EJE0EX [NJ ]− εT
√
54EJE0EX [NJ ]
)
.
Since
∑K
i=⌈K/2⌉Ni = T , we also have
∑K
i=⌈K/2⌉ E0EX [Ni] = T . Using the fact that K−⌈K/2⌉+1 ≥
max{3/2,K/2}, this implies
EJE0EX [NJ ] =
1
K − ⌈K/2⌉ + 1
K∑
i=⌈K/2⌉
E0EX [Ni] ≤ min
{
2
3
,
2
K
}
T .
Putting everything together, we get
RT ≥ ε
(
T − 2
3
T − εT
√
108T
K
)
= εT
(
1
3
− ε
√
108T
K
)
,
which picking ε = 1
6
√
108
√
K/T so that ε
√
108T/K = 1/6, gives
RT ≥ 1
375
√
KT
as desired.
In summation, Even if the technique used by Kleinberg and Leighton [20] fails in our setting, it
is still possible to prove an analogous lower bound by changing some key aspects of their analysis,
which in turn is based on the lower bound analysis of [4]. First, valuations need to be distanced as
much as possible —this is the exact opposite of their construction, where valuations were placed
ε-close to each others. Second, the base distribution is only perturbed by an appropriate small
constant. Third, the “good valuation” is drawn from a sensible proper subset of valuations.
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Algorithm 4: Cautious search
Input: Time horizon T ∈ N.
Initialization: set a← 0, b← 1, n← 1, ε← 1/2.
1 for t ∈ {1, . . . T} do
2 post Xt = a+ nε and get feedback Zt = I {Xt ≤ v};
3 if Zt = 1 then // undershooting
4 if Xt + ε < b then update n← n+ 1;
5 else update a← Xt, n← 1, ε← ε2; // shrink the interval
6 else if Zt = 0 then // overshooting
7 update a← Xt − ε, b← Xt, n← 1, ε← ε2; // shrink the interval
B Cautious search
Kleinberg and Leighton [20] were first to introduce a “cautious search” as an optimal algorithm
for posted price with a single unknown evaluation. Similarly, our cautious search (Algorithm 4)
proceeds in phases s ∈ {1, 2, . . .} in which an interval [as, bs] (initialized to [0, 1]) and a step size
εs (initialized to 1/2) are maintained. In a given phase s of the algorithm, prices as + εs, as +
2εs, as + 3εs, . . . are posted until one of them, say Xs, becomes bigger than the hidden evaluation
(overshooting). At this point a new phase begins: the interval becomes [as+1, bs+1] = [Xs−εs, Xs],
and the new step size becomes εs+1 = ε
2
s. This process continues until the length of the interval is
less than 1/T . Then the left endpoint of the interval is picked for all remaining rounds. We now
state two lemmas about the behavior of cautious search. The first one is proven in [20, Theorem
2.1].
Lemma 4. The regret of Algorithm 4 satisfies E
[∑T
t=1 rt(v)−
∑T
t=1 rt(Xt)
]
≤ 3 ln ln(T ) + 8.
Moreover, the number of overshootings is upper bounded by log log T .
The second lemma bounds the size of the interval as a function of the number of steps.
Lemma 5. For all m, the size of an interval [as, bs] after m steps of Algorithm 4 satisfies
bs − as ≤ 2
m
.
Proof. The worst case happens when the sequence (b1 − a1, b2 − a2, . . .) of interval endpoints takes
values (
1, 1,
1
2
,
1
2
,
1
4
,
1
4
,
1
4
,
1
4
, . . . ,
1
22n
, . . . ,
1
22n
, . . .
)
(11)
where the general term 1/22
n
is repeated 22
n
times. It is then sufficient to show that the inequality
holds for all values before a switch. Formally, that for all n ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .}
1
22n
≤ 2
2 +
∑n
j=0 2
2j
or, equivalently, 2 +
n∑
j=0
22
j ≤ 2 · 22n .
We prove this by induction on n. The case n = 0 is trivial. If the inequality holds for n ∈ {0, 1, . . .},
then
2 +
n+1∑
j=0
22
j
= 2 +
n∑
j=0
22
j
+ 22
n+1 ≤ 2 · 22n + 22n+1 = 22n (2 + 22n) ≤ 2 · 22n+1 .
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This concludes the proof.
The previous bound is unimprovable. Indeed in scenario (11), for all n ∈ {0, 1, . . .}
22
n
< 2 +
n∑
j=0
22
j ≤ 2 · 22n
and the second inequality is actually an equality for n = 0.
C UCB with inflated confidence bounds
In this section we prove a regret bound for UCB1 run with an oracle that systematically inflates
the upper confidence bounds for suboptimal arms.
Lemma 6. Consider a stochastic bandit problem with K arms, i.i.d. rewards Xt(k) ∈ [0, 1] from
each arm k, and average rewards µ1, . . . , µK . Let ∆k = µ
⋆ − µk where µ⋆ = µi⋆ and i⋆ is the index
of an optimal arm. Consider a UCB policy that at round t selects arm It defined by
It = argmax
k∈{1,...,K}
(
X̂t(k) + c
(
Nt(k), k
))
(ties broken arbitrarily), where X̂t is the sample average of the rewards obtained from arm k over
the Nt(k) times when the arm was chosen in rounds 1, . . . , t− 1 (initially, N1(k) = 0 for all arms)
and
c(s, k) =

α ln(δ−1)
γ2s
+
√
ln(δ−1)
s
if k is suboptimal,√
ln(δ−1)
s
otherwise,
with α ≥ 0 and c(s, k) = +∞ if s = 0. Then
RT ≤ 1 +
(
2(δT )2 +
8α ln(δ−1)
γ2
)
K +
∑
k : ∆k>0
4 ln(δ−1)
∆k
.
Proof. Pick any suboptimal arm k and t ≥ 2. Note that It = k implies
X̂t(i
⋆) + c
(
Nt(i
⋆), i⋆
) ≤ X̂t(k) + c(Nt(k), k)
which in turn imply(
X̂t(i
⋆) ≤ µ∗ − c(Nt(i⋆), i⋆)) ∨ (X̂t(k) ≥ µk + c(Nt(k), k)) ∨ (c(Nt(k), k) > ∆k/2) .
Using standard Chernoff bounds, we can write
T∑
t=2
P
(
X̂t(i
⋆) ≤ µ∗ − c(Nt(i⋆), i⋆)) ≤ T∑
t=2
P
(
∃s ∈ {1, . . . , t− 1}, X̂t(i⋆) ≤ µ∗ − c(s, i⋆)
)
≤
T∑
t=2
t−1∑
s=1
exp
(
−2s ln(δ
−1)
s
)
≤ T 2δ2
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and
T∑
t=2
P
(
X̂t(k) ≥ µk + c
(
Nt(k), k
)) ≤ T∑
t=2
P
(
∃s ∈ {1, . . . , t− 1}, X̂t(k) ≥ µk + c(s, k)
)
≤
T∑
t=2
P
(
∃s ∈ {1, . . . , t− 1}, X̂t(k) ≥ µk +
√
2 ln(δ−1)
s
)
≤
T∑
t=2
t−1∑
s=1
exp
(
−2s ln(δ
−1)
s
)
≤ T 2δ2 .
It remains to control I
{
c
(
Nt(k), k
)
> ∆k/2
}
when It = k. We now show that
T∑
t=2
I
{
c
(
Nt(k), k
)
> ∆k/2
} ≤ 4( 2α
γ2∆k
+
1
∆2k
)
ln(δ−1) .
If k is chosen s > 0 times in the first t− 1 steps, then Nt(k) = s. Thus c(s, k) > ∆k/2 implies
α ln(δ−1)
γ2s
+
√
ln(δ−1)
s
>
∆k
2
. (12)
We now prove that s must be smaller than
4
(
2α
γ2∆k
+
1
∆2k
)
ln(δ−1)
for this to happen. If α = 0 this is trivially true. To see that this still true for α > 0, note that
with this assumption (12) is equivalent to√
ln(δ−1)
s
>
−1 +
√
1 + 2∆kα/γ2
2α/γ2
.
Set x = 2∆kα/γ
2 > 0 so that the above can be rewritten as√
ln(δ−1)
s
>
∆k
(√
1 + x− 1)
x
or, squaring both sides,
s
ln δ−1
<
x2
∆2k
(√
1 + x− 1)2 .
We now prove that
x2
∆2k
(√
1 + x− 1)2 ≤ 4∆2k (x+ 1) .
Indeed, the above is equivalent to
x√
1 + x− 1 ≤ 2
√
1 + x
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Algorithm 5: Noisy Cautious Search
Input: confidence parameter δ ∈ (0, 1), valuation index i ∈ {1, 2}, lower bound γi ∈ (0, 1).
Initialization: set a← 0, b← 1.
1 for s ∈ {0, 1, . . . , ⌈log2 log2 T ⌉} do // phases
2 set n← 1, εs ← 2−2s , D ← 1;
3 while (a+ nεs < b) ∧
[
(i = 1 ∧D = 1) ∨ (i = 2 ∧D > 0)] do
4 offer price a+ nεs for
⌈
ln(δ)/ln(1− γi)
⌉
rounds; // a macrostep
5 update n← n+ 1 and the sample mean D of D(a+ (n− 1)εs);
6 update a← a+ (n− 1)εs, b← a+ nεs;
7 offer a for all remaining rounds;
which holds because
x√
1 + x− 1 =
(√
1 + x+ 1
) (√
1 + x− 1)√
1 + x− 1 ≤ 2
√
1 + x .
Setting δ = T , the regret is therefore bounded as follows
RT ≤ 1 +
∑
k : ∆k>0
∆k
T∑
t=2
P(It = k) ≤ 1 + 2KT 2δ2 + 8αK
γ2
ln(δ−1) +
∑
k : ∆k>0
4 ln(δ−1)
∆k
.
This concludes the proof.
D Two valuations
In this section we present all key results related to subroutines of Algorithm 8 and give a formal
proof of Theorem 6.
Noisy Cautious Search
This procedure is a variant of the cautious search described in Appendix B. It identifies the location
of a valuation vi with high probability and low regret whenever a lower bound γi on its probability
pi is known in advance. During the search, each price is posted for
⌈
ln(δ)/ln(1− γi)
⌉
times in a
row, where δ is a confidence parameter. We call such a sequence of consecutive rounds a macrostep.
For i = 1, we say that a macrostep is a failure if at least one price is rejected, it is a success if
all prices are accepted, and the algorithm makes a mistake if the macrostep is a success but the
price offered is strictly bigger than v1. For i = 2, we say that a macrostep is a failure if no price is
accepted, it is a success if at least one price is accepted, and the algorithm makes a mistake if the
macrostep is a failure but the price offered is at most v2.
The Noisy Cautious Search for a valuation vi proceeds in phases and begins by offering 1/2
during the first macrostep. During each phase n ≥ 0, if the last macrostep was a success, the price
offered is increased by 2−2n . As soon as a macrostep is a failure, phase n ends and phase n + 1
begins by offering the price of the last successful macrostep, plus 2−2n+1 . After ⌈log2 log2 T ⌉ phases,
the price of the last successful macrostep is offered for all remaining rounds.
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Lemma 7. The Noisy Cautious Search for vi with parameters i, δ, γi satisfies the following:
1. the price offered during each macrostep m is 2/m-close to vi with probability at least 1−mδ;
2. the total reward accumulated by the end of macrostep m is at least(
mviD(vi)− 3(ln lnT )− 8
) ln δ
ln(1− γi)
with probability at least 1−mδ.
Proof. Claim 1 follows by Lemma 5 and the fact that the probability of making a mistake during
each macrostep is at most δ by Chernoff inequality for Bernoulli random variables. Similarly,
claim 2 follows by Lemma 4 and, again, Chernoff inequality.
Capped Mean Estimation
We begin this section by providing a method to find a high-confidence multiplicative estimate of
the expectation µ of any [0, 1]-valued random variable, using only O( ln(1/δ)/µ) samples. Most
notably, the expectation µ need not be known in advance. With our novel technique, we improve
upon Berthet and Perchet [7, Lemma 13], that proved a similar risult using O( ln(1/δ)/µ2) samples.
This result will be pivotal for our analysis and we believe it will also be valuable in its own right.
For any set X1, . . . ,XT of random variables, we denote by
X t =
1
t
t∑
s=1
Xs and S
2
t =
1
t− 1
t∑
s=1
(
Xs −X t
)2
the sample mean and the sample variance of the first t random variables. The following result
is a straightforward consequence of the empirical Bernstein bound and the confidence bound for
standard deviation proven in [21, Theorems 4, 10].
Theorem 8. Let X1, . . . ,XT be a set of [0, 1]-valued i.i.d. random variables with expectation µ and
standard deviation σ. For all δ ∈ (0, 1) and all t ∈ {2, . . . , T}, the two following conditions hold
simultaneously with probability at least 1− 3δ
∣∣Xt − µ∣∣ ≤ √2St( ln(1/δ)
t
)1/2
+
7
3
ln(1/δ)
t− 1 and St ≤ σ +
√
2
(
ln(1/δ)
t− 1
)1/2
.
We can now prove our multiplicative mean estimation theorem.
Theorem 9 (Multiplicative mean estimation). Let X1, . . . ,XT be a set of [0, 1]-valued i.i.d. random
variables with expectation µ > 0 and standard deviation σ. For all δ ∈ (0, 1) and all α ≥ 0, if T ≥ t0,
where
t0 =
⌈
α+ 2
3µ
ln
(
1
δ
)(√
9α2 + 114α + 192 + 3α + 19
)⌉
+ 2 = O
(
α2
µ
ln
1
δ
)
and τ = τ(T, δ, α) is the smallest time t ∈ {2, . . . , T} such that
X t
α+ 1
≥
√
2St
(
ln(1/δ)
t
)1/2
+
7
3
ln(1/δ)
t− 1 (13)
then, with probability at least 1− 3(T − 1)δ,
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1. τ ≤ t0,
2. for all t ∈ {2, . . . , T} such that (13) holds,(
α
α+ 1
)
Xt < µ <
(
α+ 2
α+ 1
)
X t . (14)
Proof. Denote for all t ∈ {2, . . . , T}, ct =
√
2S2t ln(1/δ)/t + (7/3) ln(1/δ)/(t − 1). By Theorem 8,
the good event
G =
{
∀t ∈ {2, . . . , T}, Xt − ct < µ < X t + ct and St ≤ σ +
√
2 ln(1/δ)/(t − 1)
}
has probability P(G) ≥ 1− 3(T − 1)δ. For all outcomes in G and all t ∈ {2, . . . , T},
X t < (α+ 1)ct ⇐⇒ µ− ct < Xt < (α+ 1)ct =⇒ µ < (α+ 2)ct =⇒ t < t0
hence τ ≤ t0. This implies that for all outcomes in G and all t ∈ {1, . . . , T} such that X t ≥ (α+1)ct,(
α
α+ 1
)
Xt = X t − Xt
α+ 1
≤ Xt − ct < µ < Xt + ct ≤ X t + Xt
α+ 1
=
(
α+ 2
α+ 1
)
Xt.
The following capped version of the previous theorem interrupts the process if during the mul-
tiplicative mean estimation it is learned that µ is smaller than some threshold parameter θ.
Corollary 1 (Capped Mean Estimation). For any threshold parameter θ ∈ [0, 1], under the same
assumptions of Theorem 9, define τθ = min{τ, tθ}, where
tθ =
⌈
α+ 2
3θ
ln
(
1
δ
)(√
9α2 + 114α + 192 + 3α+ 19
)⌉
+ 2 = O
(
α2
θ
ln
1
δ
)
.
With probability at least 1− 3(T − 1)δ,
1. if τθ = τ , then for all t ∈ {2, . . . , T} such that (13) holds, inequalities (14) also hold;
2. if τθ = tθ, then µ ≤ θ.
Our Capped Mean Estimation is defined as the Capped Mean Estimation of the demand curve
(or one minus the demand curve if ρ = 1) at a given sequence of prices3 x1, x2, . . ., with threshold
θ ∈ [0, 1] (where 1/θ is interpreted as ∞ when θ = 0), confidence parameter δ ∈ (0, 1), reverse
parameter ρ (that regulates if D(x1) or 1−D(x1) is being estimated) and α = 1 (Algorithm 6).
Variant: Joint Capped Mean Estimation
We call (w, θ, δ)-Joint Capped Mean Estimation a variant of Algorithm 6 in which xt = w for all
t and estimations for both ρ = 0 and ρ = 1 are carried on at the same time; i.e., where both D
(sample mean for ρ = 0) and D
′
= 1−D (sample mean for ρ = 1), as well as their respective sample
3This algorithm is only used for prices x1, x2, . . . such such that D(xs) = D(xt) for all s, t.
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Algorithm 6: Capped Mean Estimation
Input: x1, x2, . . . ∈ [0, 1], θ ∈ [0, 1], δ ∈ (0, 1), ρ ∈ {0, 1}.
Initialization: set t← 3 and D̂s = (1− ρ)I {Vs ≥ xs}+ ρ(1− I {Vs ≥ xs}) for all s.
1 offer x1 and x2 once each;
2 set D ← 12
∑2
s=1 D̂s and S
2 ←∑2s=1 (D̂s −D)2;
3 while
[
t ≤ ⌈40 ln(1/δ)/θ⌉ + 2] ∧ [D <√8S2 ln(1/δ)/t + (14/3) ln(1/δ)/(t − 1)] do
4 offer price xt once;
5 update D ← (D(t− 1) + D̂t)/t, S2 ← (S2(t− 2) + (D̂t −D)2)/(t− 1), and t← t+ 1;
6 if t > ⌈40 ln(1/δ)/θ⌉ + 2 then return that µ ≤ θ;
7 else return D/2;
variances S2 and (S′)2 are maintained; the condition
[
D ≤
√
8S2 ln(1/δ)/t+(14/3) ln(1/δ)/(t−1)]
in the while loop is replaced by
(
A ∨A′) = ([D <√8S2
t
ln
1
δ
+
14
3(t− 1) ln
1
δ
]
∨
[
D
′
<
√
8(S′)2
t
ln
1
δ
+
14
3(t− 1) ln
1
δ
])
and at the end, we returnD/2 (resp., D
′
/2) and we say that D(w) (resp., 1−D(w)) is well-estimated
if and only if A (resp., A′) is false; if A (resp., A′) is true we return that D(w) (resp., 1−D(w)) is
at most θ.
Variant: Capped Mean Estimation on Noisy Cautious Search
With a slight abuse of notation, we say that a (θ, δ, ρ)-Capped Mean Estimation is run on a (δ, i, γi)-
Noisy Cautious Search if x1, x2, . . . are the prices offered during the first successful macrosteps of a
(δ, i, γi)-Noisy Cautious Search run for Θ
(
1
D(x1)
)
macrosteps (resp., Θ
(
1
1−D(x1)
)
macrosteps); i.e.,
while the Noisy Cautious Search proceeds, an increasingly accurate estimate p̂ of D(x1) (resp.,
1−D(x1)) is maintained at the same time using samples from successful macrosteps; as soon as the
stopping criterion for the Capped Mean Estimation is met, the estimation stops while the Noisy
Cautious Search proceeds until it reaches ⌈6/p̂⌉ macrosteps, at which point the whole process ends
returning p̂ and the price v̂i offered during the last succesful Noisy Cautious Search macrostep.
Cautious Mean Estimation
The main idea of this section is that the problem for K = 2 is completely solved by determining v1,
v2, and p2. This suggests that computing an high-confidence estimate p2 once a value w ∈ (v1, v2]
is located might be a good idea. Sadly, it is not. The problem with this approach is that if p2
is very small an arbitrary high regret may be incurred in doing so. On the other hand, the more
evidence is gathered that p2 is very small, the less likely it is that v2 is optimal. For these and
other more subtle reasons, a great deal of caution is needed in order to obtain estimate of p2 that
is just good enough to use.
The algorithm we present for dealing with these issues is called Cautious Mean Estimation
and it receives as an input a price w ∈ (v1, v2] (i.e., that can be used to estimate p2), as well as a
confidence parameter δ. The routine begins by determining if p1 and p2 are both bigger than 1/4 by
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Algorithm 7: Cautious Mean Estimation
Input: price w ∈ [0, 1], confidence parameter δ ∈ (0, 1).
1 run a (w, 2−2, δ)-Joint Capped Mean Estimation, returning p̂1, p̂2;
2 if D(w) and 1−D(w) are both well-estimated then // 1/4 ≤ p1, p2 ≤ 3/4
3 return p̂1, p̂2;
4 else if 1−D(w) is well-estimated then // p1 > 3/4
5 for s ∈ {2, 3, . . .} do
6 offer 2−s for
⌈
ln(δ)/ ln(3/4)
⌉
rounds;
7 if all offers are accepted then break and return that v1 is optimal;
8 else
9 continue the Joint Capped Mean Estimation with new parameters w, 2−(s+1), δ;
10 if p1 and p2 are both well-estimated then break and return p̂1, p̂2;
11 else if D(w) is well-estimated then // p2 > 3/4
12 run (0, δ, 1)-Capped Mean Estimation on
(
δ, 2, 34
)
-Noisy Cautious Search, returning
p̂1, v̂2;
13 offer v̂2q̂2 − p̂1 for
⌈
ln(1/δ)/p̂1
⌉
rounds, where q̂2 ← 1− p̂1;
14 if at least one offer is rejected then return that v2 is optimal;
15 else return p̂1, p̂2;
using a Joint Capped Mean Estimation and invoking Corollary 1. If this is true, it simply returns
the estimates of p1 and p2 to the main routine; otherwise it behaves differently depending on which
one is true: p2 ≤ 1/4 or p2 ≥ 3/4, which can be checked invoking again Corollary 1. If p2 ≤ 1/4, it
proceeds in phases. In each phase s, it checks if v1 ≥ 2−s by offering 2−s a small number of times,
in which case it halts returning that v1 is the optimum. If it is not, it determines if p1 and p2 are
bigger than 2−(k+1) by using one more time Corollary 1, in which case it returns their estimates to
the main routine. If they are not, it moves on to phase k + 1. If on the other hand p2 was bigger
than 3/4, it performs a Noisy Cautious Search for v2, while at the same time collecting samples to
estimate p1, returning estimates v̂2 and p̂1. Then it first checks if v1 ≤ v̂2(1− p̂1) − p̂1 by posting
the latter for
⌈
ln(1/δ)/p̂1
⌉
rounds. If the test is positive, it halts returning that v2 is the optimum.
Otherwise it returns p̂1 and p̂2 to the main routine.
Lemma 8. For all w ∈ (v1, v2] and all δ ∈ (0, 1), the Cautious Mean Estimation run with param-
eters w, δ satisfies the following with probability at least 1− (15T − 13)δ:
1. if the algorithm returns that v1 or v2 is optimal, then it is correct;
2. if the algorithm returns p̂1 and p̂2, then both satisfy pi/3 < p̂i < pi;
3. the regret of the algorithm it at most (13)2 ln(1/δ) + 6.
Proof. By definition of Joint Capped Mean Estimation, line 7 lasts for at most
⌈
160 ln(1/δ)
⌉
+ 2
rounds, which upper bounds the regret accrued during those time steps. Denote G the good event
in which which items 1 and 2 of Corollary 1 hold simultaneously for both the estimate of p1 and
p2. To prove the result, we can (and do!) restrict our analysis to good outcomes, i.e., outcomes
belonging in G. Indeed, Corollary 1 implies that one and only one of the three conditions at lines
2, 4, and 11 is executed with probability at least P(G) ≥ 1− 6(T − 1)δ and we will show that the
result holds in all three cases.
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If the condition at line 2 is true, then the result follows immediately by Corollary 1.
Assume now that the condition at line 4 is true and fix k ∈ N such that 2−k ≤ max{v1, p2} ≤
2−(k−1). Note that if v1 ≥ p2, the loop at line 5 will break with probability at least 1−δ (by Chernoff
inequality) at line 7 as soon as s = k; this proves point 1 for v1. If on the other hand v1 < p2,
the loop will break with probability at least 1 − 6(T − 1)δ (by Corollary 1) at line 10 as soon as
s = k−1; this proves point 2. In any case, then, at most k−1 cycles of the loop are performed with
probability at least 1−(6T −5)δ. If s ≤ k, line 6 is performed at most k−1 times and since the cost
of sampling is at most v1 (if v1 is optimal) or p2 (if v2 is optimal), than the total regret accrued by
executing line 6 is at most (k − 1)⌈ ln(δ)/ ln(3/4)⌉max{v1, p2} ≤ (e ln 2)−1⌈ ln(δ)/ ln(3/4)⌉, where
we used x log2(1/x) ≤ (e ln 2)−1, for all x > 0. On the other hand, by the end of phase k the Joint
Capped Mean Estimation at lines 7, 9 has offered w for at most
⌈
2k+140 ln(1/δ)
⌉
+ 2 accruing at
most 40 ln(1/δ) + 3 regret. This proves point 3.
Finally, consider the case in which the condition at line 11 is true. The Noisy Cautious Search
at line 12 stops after at most
⌈
40 ln(1/δ)/p1
⌉
+2 rounds, returning p̂i ∈ (pi/3, pi), with probability
at least 1−(7T −6)δ by the fact that it makes a mistake with probability at most δ and Theorem 9.
This proves point 2. If v2 is optimal, Lemma 7 shows that the regret of the Noisy Cautious Search
is at most
(
3(ln lnT ) + 8 ln(1/δ)
)
ln(4/3) with probability at least 1 − Tδ. If v1 is optimal, the
additional regret is at most
(⌈40 ln(1/δ)/p1⌉+ 2)(v1 − wp2) ≤ 40 ln(1/δ) + 3.
Consider now lines 13-14. Since p1/3 < p̂1 < p1, then p2 < q̂2 < p2 + (2/3)p1. Furthermore,
v2 − p1 ≤ v̂2 ≤ v2 with probability at least 1− Tδ by Lemma 7. If the test at line 14 is true, then
v1 < v2p2 and v2 is optimal with probability at least 1− δ; this proves point 1 for v2. To compute
the regret accumulated at line 13, assume first that v1 is optimal; then necessarily v1 ≥ v̂2q̂2 − p̂1
and the regret of line 13 is at most (v1−v̂2q̂2+p̂1)
⌈
3 ln(1/δ)/p1
⌉ ≤ 9 ln(1/δ)+3. If on the other hand
v2 is optimal, then the regret of line 13 is at most (p2v2 − v̂2q̂2 + p̂1)
⌈
3 ln(1/δ)/p1
⌉ ≤ 6 ln(1/δ) + 2.
This proves point 3 and concludes the proof.
2-UCB
This subroutine is a slightly modified version of Algorithm 3. The only differences are that two
feasible intervals are initialized at the beginning, each valuation vi gets a personalized number of
rounds
⌈
8 ln(δ)/ ln(1− γi)
⌉
at line 6, and the test at line 11 need not be executed as it is known in
advance that K = 2.
The following result is a straightforward adaptation of Theorem 5. As such, the proof is omitted.
Lemma 9. If ∆ = |p2v2 − v1|, γ1 ≤ p1, γ2 ≤ p2, and 2-UCB run with δ = T−2, it incurs a regret
O
(
lnT
∆
+ (lnT )(ln lnT )
(
α1
− ln(1− γ1) +
α2
− ln(1− γ2)
))
,
where (α1, α2) = (v1 − v1p2, v1) if v1 is optimal, (α1, α2) = (v2p2 − v1p2, p2v2) if v2 is optimal, and
the first term is absent if ∆ = 0.
Proof of Theorem 6
We finally have all the instruments to prove Theorem 6, that we restate for completeness.
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Algorithm 8:
Input: Confidence parameter δ ∈ (0, 1).
1 run a Binary Search, returning [a1, a2]; // phase 1
2 run a Capped Mean Estimation of the demand at a2 with parameter θ = a1, returning p˜2;
3 if p˜2 > 0 then set w ← a2 ;
4 else
5 offer price a1 until it is rejected; // check if a1 < v1 ≤ v2 < a2
6 set w ← a1;
7 run a Cautious Mean Estimation of the demand at w, returning p̂1 and p̂2; // phase 2
8 if the Cautious Mean Estimation was halted because v1 or v2 is the obvious optimum then
9 run a Cautious Search for the optimal valuation with lower bound 1/2;
10 else run 2-UCB with parameters γ1 = p̂1 and γ2 = p̂2 ; // shrink the interval
Theorem 10. 6 If Algorithm 8 is run on two unknown pairs (v1, p1) and (v2, p2) with input pa-
rameter δ = T−2, then its regret satisfies
RT = O
(
log T
∆
+ (log T )(log log T )
)
,
where the first term is absent if ∆ = |p2v2 − v1| is zero.
Proof. Putting together the proofs of all previous lemmas, the probability of making a mistake in
at least a test of at least a routine is upper bounded by O(Tδ). For this reason, we can (an do)
assume that no mistakes happen. We divide the proof into three different cases.
Case 1 Assume that during phase 1 all offers of a2 are rejected and all offers of a1 are accepted.
Consider the following four subcases. If a1 ≤ v1 ≤ v2 ≤ a2, the regret is at most O(log T ).
Assume now that v1 ≤ a1 ≤ v2 ≤ a2. If v2 is optimal, then the regret is at most O
(
log(T )/a1
)
=
O( log(T )/∆). If v1 is optimal, then the regret is at most O((v1 − a1p2)T + v1 ln(T )/a1) =
O(a1p1T + ln(T )). Note that this case only happens with probability pO(T−ln(T )/a1)2 , which is at
least 1/T only if p1 = O
( log T
T−log(T )/a1
)
. Now, if a1 = Ω
(
log(T )/T
)
then the regret is at most
O(log T ); otherwise it is at most O(log T ) because v1 is small. If a1 ≤ v1 ≤ a2 ≤ v2, the regret is
at most O((max{v1, p2v2} − a1)T +max{v1, p2v2} log(T )/a1). Since all offers of a2 were rejected,
Corollary 1 implies that p2 ≤ a1, then p2v2 ≤ a1 ≤ v1, hence v1 is optimal. The regret is therefore
at most O(log T ). Finally, assume that v1 ≤ a1 ≤ a2 ≤ v2. Combining the same arguments as
above, v1 is optimal but p1 is small and the total regret is at most O(log T ).
Case 2 Assume that during phase 1 some offers of a2 are accepted. Corollary 1 implies that the
first Capped Mean Estimation lasts at most O( log(T )/max{a1, p2}) rounds, hence its regrets is at
most O(log T ). Lemma 8 implies that the Cautious Mean Estimation has a regret at most O(log T ).
If the cautious mean estimation is halted returning that v1 or v2 is optimal, then Lemma 7 implies
that the regret is at most O((log T )(log log T )). Assume now that the cautious mean estimation
returns p̂1, p̂2. By construction, if p2 ≤ 1/4, then necessarily v1 ≤ 2p2, thus ∆ ≤ 2p2. On the other
end, if p2 ≥ 3/4, then necessarily v1 ≥ p2v2 − 2p1 thus ∆ ≤ 2p1 if v2 is optimal. Using Lemma 9
and plugging in the above upper bounds gives the result.
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Case 3 Assume that during phase 1 all offers of a2 are rejected and some offers of a1 are rejected.
The proof of this case is the same as the previous one, except that sampling a2 has an extra
regret cost. If v1 is optimal, then the additional regret is at most O
(
v1 log(T )/a1
)
= O(lnT )
because v1 < a1. Finally, assume that v2 is optimal. If v2 ≤ a2, the additional cost is at most(
ln(T )/a1
)
p2v2 = O(lnT ). If a2 < v2, then p2 ≤ a1 by Corollary 1 and the additional cost is at
most O((p2v2 − p2a2) log(T )/a1) = O(log T ).
E Nonstochastic dynamic pricing: some initial results
In this section we present some initial results for the nonstochastic setting; namely, when the
sequence V1, V2, . . . is deterministic rather than stochastic. This setting was studied in [20] without
the restriction that each Vt belongs to a common finite set of valuations. We show an upper bound
of O(√T ) on the regret in the simple case when Vt ∈ {v1, v2} for all t (with 0 ≤ v1 ≤ v2 ≤ 1) and
v2 is known. Note that this is not significantly improvable, as a matching lower bound of Ω(
√
T )
can be proven in the stochastic setting even when v1 and v2 are both known. To see that, consider
v1 =
1
2 and v2 =
3
4 with D(v2) =
2
3 ± ε for ε < 13 , so that v1 has constant revenue 12 , and v2 has
expected revenue 12 ± 34ε. We can now adapt the argument in the proof of the nonstochastic bandit
lower bound of [4] for the two equiprobable scenarios D(v2) =
2
3 + ε and D(v2) =
2
3 − ε. This
allows us to conclude that in the first T rounds any algorithm suffers regret of order ε T unless v2
is played at least ε−2 times. Choosing ε = T−1/2 gives the desired bound.
The algorithm achieving regret RT = O
(√
T
)
uses the nonstochastic bandit algorithm Exp3 [4]
fed with losses ℓt(x) = 1− rt(x). Since
T∑
t=1
(
rt(x)− rt(Xt)
)
=
T∑
t=1
(
ℓt(Xt)− ℓt(x)
)
always hold, bounding the regret of Exp3 defined with respect to losses is equivalent to bounding
the regret with respect to revenues. However, as only v2 is known, we run Exp3 using two actions:
v2 and an action, called b, that starts at v2 and converges to v1 during the execution of Exp3. In
particular, we decrease b by steps of length T−1/2 whenever b is played and rejected. Clearly, b
stops moving as soon as b ∈ (v1 − T−1/2, v1], which is good enough to bound Exp3’s future regret.
In order to bound the regret incurred while b > v1 holds, note that as long as b > v1 is true, we
have: ℓt(b) < ℓt(v1) when Vt = v2, and ℓt(b) > ℓt(v1) when Vt = v1. The problem is that we can not
bound deterministically the smallest time t such that b ≤ v1, as this depends on the buyers’ choices
and the algorithm’s random sequence of actions. On the other hand, we know that ℓt(b) > ℓt(v1)
and Xt = b can simultaneously occur at most
√
T times, because b is decreased by T−1/2 when this
happens. We can exploit this observation as follows: when Exp3 plays b and does not sell, then we
feed the algorithm a reduced loss of zero. This has the effect of underestimating the algorithm loss
by an amount which is bounded by the number of times the algorithm got a reduced loss. This
effect is only increasing the regret by at most
√
T , since is the largest number of times b can be
decreased while being larger than v1.
More formally, our algorithm runs Exp3 on the two prices bt and v2, where bt is dynamically
adjusted during the execution. Price bt is used to locate v1 and is initially set to v2. Exp3 is
run with reduced losses ℓ˜t of the form ℓ˜t(bt) = ℓt(bt)I {Vt ≥ bt} and ℓ˜t(v2) = ℓt(v2), where ℓt(x) =
1−x I {Vt ≥ x} are the true losses. Note that, whenever bt > v1, Vt = v1 implies ℓ˜t(bt) = 0 = ℓt(v1),
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and Vt = v2 implies ℓ˜t(b) ≤ ℓ(v1). Since bt is random (it depends on X1, . . . ,Xt−1), ℓ˜t(bt) and ℓt(bt)
are also random. Technically, this corresponds to running Exp3 with a nonoblivious adversary —see,
e.g., [14, Remark 4.1]. However, the regret bounds of Exp3 hold unchanged even for nonoblivious
adversaries.
During the execution of Exp3, bt is adjusted according to the following rule: if bt is posted at
time t and Vt < bt, then bt+1 = bt − T−1/2. For all t let Vt ∈ {v1, v2} be the value played by the
adversary at time t and Xt ∈ {bt, v2} be the price posted by the algorithm.
Theorem 11. The regret of the above algorithm satisfies RT ≤ 2
√
T +
√
4T ln 2.
Proof. Since b1 ≤ v2 < 1, and because Xt = bt and I {Vt < bt} imply bt+1 = bt − T−1/2, we have
that
T∑
t=1
I {Xt = bt} I {Vt < bt} <
√
T .
Therefore, the true total loss of Exp3 deterministically relates to its reduced loss as follows,
T∑
t=1
ℓ˜t(Xt) =
T∑
t=1
ℓt(Xt)−
T∑
t=1
ℓt(bt)I {Xt = bt} I {Vt < bt} ≥
T∑
t=1
ℓt(Xt)−
√
T . (15)
If bt ≤ v1 for some t, then bt is always accepted. Hence it is never decreased further, which in turn
implies that bt > v1 − T−1/2 holds for all t. So we have that ℓ˜t(bt) ≤ ℓt(v1) + T−1/2. Recalling
that ℓ˜t(v2) = ℓt(v2) and using Exp3 regret bound (see, e.g., [11, Theorem 3.1]) applied to the
nonoblivious reduced losses ℓ˜t, we obtain
E
[
T∑
t=1
ℓt(Xt)
]
−
√
T ≤ E
[
T∑
t=1
ℓ˜t(Xt)
]
(using (15))
≤ min
{
T∑
t=1
ℓ˜t(bt),
T∑
t=1
ℓ˜t(v2)
}
+
√
4T ln 2
≤ min
{
T∑
t=1
(
ℓt(v1) + T
−1/2
)
,
T∑
t=1
ℓt(v2)
}
+
√
4T ln 2 .
Therefore, we get
E
[
T∑
t=1
ℓt(Xt)
]
≤ min
v∈{v1,v2}
T∑
t=1
ℓt(v) + 2
√
T +
√
4T ln 2
concluding the proof.
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